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Abstract 
In this study, we examine whether and how gender of engagement audit partners 
affects client acceptance decisions. Using a sample of 2,767 firm-year 
observations of firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) from 
2013 to 2014, we empirically investigate and compare the riskiness of clienteles 
between female and male auditors. The results indicate that on average female 
auditors have less risky clients in their client portfolios than male auditors. 
Furthermore, the negative association between female auditor gender and the level 
of risk in clienteles is more pronounced among the riskiest group of clients. The 
findings of this study suggest that gender differences between auditors may have 
important implications for client acceptance decisions and that such differences 
are more likely driven by high-risk engagement decisions.  
 
Keywords: audit client portfolios, client acceptance, gender, audit engagement 
partner, auditor characteristics
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, economic 
volatility and heightened client business risk, when combined with the inherent 
complexities of financial reporting requirements, impose enormous challenges on 
auditors (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board [IAASB], 2014). 
Accordingly, the importance of implementing and following rigorous client 
acceptance procedures in audit firms as a quality control system has been 
highlighted by both external regulators and within the accounting profession 
(CPA Australia, 2010; ASIC, 2015). The client acceptance decision is vitally 
important to audit firms and auditors, particularly in today’s high-risk 
environment. A high-risk client could seriously jeopardise an audit firm’s viability, 
as was most famously demonstrated by the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002.  
The client acceptance decision function is an integral part of the overall 
audit process, involving evaluation of the total engagement risk associated with a 
particular client and demanding considerable professional judgement from audit 
engagement partners (Colbert et al. 1996). Professional standards also require 
partners to take responsibility for evaluating the overall engagement risk level 
before accepting an audit engagement (ASA 220, para 8), while acknowledging 
that “there is not necessarily one correct answer in making a judgement” 
(International Federation of Accountants [IFAC], 2012, p. 3). Similarly, the 
Deloitte audit firm notes in its 2015 transparency report that “…every audit 
engagement is led by a partner, and our engagement partners are fully responsible 
for the services they provide” (p. 14). Therefore, while audit firms implement a 
set of formal procedures regarding client acceptance decisions, the actual amount 
of client-related evidence collected and detailed evaluation of risk factors are 
determined by the audit partner in charge of the engagement. Despite the 
significant role of individual auditors, except for a few experimental studies 
(Johnstone 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Cohen and Hanno 2000), prior 
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empirical research has focused largely on audit firms’ client portfolio 
management viewed primarily through the lens of trade-offs between expected 
revenues from engagement and possible engagement losses such as litigation costs 
and reputation loss (Choi et al. 2004; Jones and Raghunandan 1998; Krishnan and 
Francis 2002). This study aims to fill this gap by examining the impact of the 
individual characteristics of auditors in the context of the client acceptance 
decision.   
A growing body of audit literature recognising that auditors should not be 
assumed to be homogenous within audit firms has called for more attention to be 
paid to individual auditor characteristics in general (DeFond and Francis 2005; 
DeFond and Zhang 2014; Francis 2011; Nelson and Tan 2005) and auditor gender 
specifically (Birnberg 2011). Reflecting this interest and drawing on 
psychological literature, a number of researchers have provided evidence to 
suggest that females’ relatively lower tolerance of risk and use of more detailed 
information processing strategy affect audit-related judgement and decision-
making (e.g., Hardies et al. 2014; Ittonen and Vähämaa 2013; Niskanen et al. 
2011). Those reported gender differences in risk tolerance and information 
processing have significant implications for auditors’ judgements in the client 
acceptance process because they are likely to affect both the amount of evidence 
considered and the eventual assessment of risk, which may lead to significant 
variation in engagement decisions between male and female auditors. By 
recognising the important role of individual auditors in making client acceptance 
decisions, this study brings one key individual characteristic, gender, into the 
context of the client acceptance decision process. More specifically, we 
investigate whether and to what extent the gender of engagement audit partners 
affect client acceptance decisions. In explaining the causes of gender differences 
such as risk attitudes and information processing, this study draws on the view 
that gender as a category depends largely on context and that salient gender 
structures are likely to lead individuals to behave in a stereotypical manner 
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(Kramer 2011; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). In supporting this view, a 
number of researchers suggest that when individuals within minority experience 
stereotypes that are negatively related to their performance, they are likely to 
focus on monitoring themselves and ‘become vigilant to detect the sign of failure 
or errors’, resulting in more cautious and conservative behaviour in decision-
making (Spencer et al. 2016, 421). Given that female auditors are in the numerical 
minority and that the auditor stereotype is typically male (Anderson-Gough et al. 
2005; Hardies 2011; Kornberger et al. 2010), this study posits that gender-related 
behaviours are highly likely to manifest themselves in client acceptance decisions. 
If systematic differences between female and male auditors (such as risk 
perception and information processing) influence their judgements, female 
auditors would be expected to be more sensitive to negative evidence and these 
differences should be reflected in their client portfolios. Therefore, this study 
examines whether female audit partners’ clienteles are on the whole less risky 
than male audit partners’ clienteles by comparing the characteristics of the clients 
for each group.  
We further investigate whether the association between auditor gender and 
clientele riskiness is more pronounced in the high-risk engagement context. 
Although a majority of the literature supports differences between females’ and 
males’ attitudes to risk and their information processing patterns, some 
researchers insist that the common assumption that females are more risk-averse 
than males warrants further and more sophisticated investigation
1
 (Hyde 2014; 
Nelson 2015). Within the auditing context, the level of risk is a significant factor 
in determining individual auditors’ differences. The professional literature 
(D'Aquila et al. 2010) also suggests that high-risk engagement in particular 
requires auditors’ professional judgement in planning audit procedures that are 
                                           
1
 For instance, Nelson’s (2015) meta-analysis of 35 scholarly works examined statistically 
significant findings to estimate the effect size of gender differences and found that the genders are 
in fact much more similar in terms of outlook. In conclusion, she suggests that gender difference is 
apparent only at extreme levels of risk-taking decisions. 
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highly tailored to that particular client and thus differ from the standardised audit 
manual and routine engagement assessment undertaken in the context of ordinary 
levels of risk.  In addition to audit firms’ formal process of client acceptance 
decisions, auditors’ work is subject to a set of principles and professional 
requirements. Given recently heightened regulation and its emphasis on auditor 
independence, auditors are expected to be more conservative when making client 
acceptance decisions. If auditors’ behaviours are mitigated by these trends and 
professional norms, it is unclear to what extent the effects of gender differences 
would be discernable in overall decision-making or whether professional 
standards and firm norms have a more powerful influence than gender differences. 
This study therefore extends the prior research on gender effects in the audit 
context (Hardies et al. 2014) by considering situational factors that may motivate 
individual auditors’ differences or drive gender-related behaviours. More 
specifically, we posit that differences between female and male auditors will be 
pronounced in the high-risk engagement context, in which a significant amount of 
professional judgement is inevitable and which are by definition more likely to 
pose the greatest risk to audit firms.  
Using a sample of Australian listed companies from 2013 to 2014, we 
find that on average female auditors have less risky clients in their client 
portfolios than male auditors. The results also show that the negative relationship 
between female auditor gender and the level of risk in clienteles is more 
pronounced among the riskiest group of clients. These findings may mean that 
while auditor gender differences influence the evaluation of engagement risk and 
thus client acceptance decisions, gender effects are more likely to be operative in 
the high-risk engagement context, where a more significant amount of 
professional judgement is required and which is likely to pose the greatest risk 
threat to auditors and firms. The results are robust for the balanced panel data and 
the 2013 and 2014 financial year subsamples.  
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This study makes a number of contributions. First, it adds to the limited 
research on client acceptance decisions at the individual level of analysis. While 
the current study confirms prior experimental studies showing that individual 
auditors differ in evaluating or weighting risk factors, it also suggests that 
individual auditor differences do have a significant implication in acceptance 
decisions. From the supply-side perspective, understanding that client acceptance 
decisions are made not only by firms but also by the engagement auditor in charge 
should provide additional insights into the audit process.  
Second, this study provides consistent evidence that gender may affect 
auditor judgements and decision-making (e.g., Gold et al. 2009; Hardies et al. 
2014; Ittonen and Peni 2012) while also extending prior findings by incorporating 
contextual factors that may drive or exacerbate gender differences. While there 
has been increasing interest in gender differences in the auditing context, some 
researchers (Hardies 2011) have noted that merely describing differences based on 
psychological literature may be problematic in actually understanding gender 
differences. This study takes into account the important role of context to explain 
why the gender-related behaviours observed may occur. Furthermore, the current 
study outlines the potentially important contextual factors that may magnify 
gender differences, thereby responding to calls by a number of researchers (Hyde 
2014; Nelson 2015) to explore situational factors that maximise or minimise 
gender differences.  
Third, understanding how individual differences in cognitive processing and 
risk perception may influence evaluation of engagement risk level may be of 
interest to audit practitioners. Many public audit firms have investigated or 
implemented computer-based audit decision aids (Bell et al. 2001), which have 
become even more important in the aftermath of major corporate collapses and the 
global financial crisis. Similarly, in the most recent ASIC inspection report, 
“client acceptance and continuation” was recommended as one of the areas 
needing further improvement for the third consecutive year (2012–2014), 
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suggesting both the importance of engagement management for audit firms and 
the difficulties they have experienced in addressing engagement pitfalls. If there is 
an individual difference in terms of risk level and cognitive processing, decision 
aid tools could take those differences into account and be tailored to assist specific 
auditors in assessing engagement risk factors. If implicit stereotypes are part of 
the organizational culture and subtle biases may unconsciously influence auditors’ 
judgement, diversity training and direct intervention such as mentoring programs 
may be appropriate. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and present our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and 
research methodology and Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 
summarises and concludes the study.  
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Client Acceptance Decisions 
Once the potential audit engagement opportunity is identified, auditors 
gather relevant information about the potential client and evaluate the overall 
engagement risk in the light of their risk management strategies (e.g., staff 
assignment, industry expertise, extending the audit efforts) to determine whether 
any identified risks could be mitigated to an acceptable level
2
 (Johnstone and 
Bedard  2003; Khalil et al. 2011; AUASB, 2013a). If the identified threats and 
risks are judged to be beyond an acceptable level, Australian audit and ethical 
standards ASA 200 and ASES 110 require audit partners to decline such an audit 
engagement, otherwise partners in charge submit a proposal to provide audit 
                                           
2
 Anecdotal evidence and previous studies (e.g., Asare et al. 1994; Johnstone and Bedard 2004) 
suggest that audit engagement opportunity arises from receiving the client firm’s expression of 
interest (e.g., personal contact via a referral, putting its audit out to tender) or auditors’ business 
networking activities (e.g., charitable, social and business organisation).  
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services for the prospective clients or retain the relationship with an existing client 
(APESB, 2010; AUASB, 2011). However, the acceptable level is defined 
relatively vaguely in the code as “a level at which a reasonable and an informed 
third party would be likely to conclude, weighing all the specific facts and 
circumstances available to the member at that time, that compliance with the 
fundamental principles is not compromised” (APESB, 2010, p. 4).  
Various factors can affect an auditor’s judgement and decision in accepting 
audit clients and a similar level of risky clients may be categorised as excessively 
risky depending on how auditors weigh expected costs/ risks against anticipated 
revenue.  
2.2 Factors Affecting Auditors’ Client Acceptance Decisions 
Prior research has documented a significant role which auditor size (i.e., Big 
N versus non-Big N) plays in the audit firm’s client acceptance and continuance 
decisions, and overall engagement risk management. However, the results are 
mixed. In general, the research shows that Big N audit firms are more likely to 
avoid risky engagements evidenced by resigning from high-risk clients (Catanach, 
Irving, Williams, & Walker, 2011) or adjusting their client portfolios in response 
to the increase in litigation risk (Choi, Doogar, & Ganguly, 2004; Jones and 
Raghunandan 1998). Other research (Zhan Shu, 2000; Krishnan & Francis, 2002) 
suggests that large audit firms may spread the given client risk over a large client 
base portfolio. They also have more resources to invest in industry expertise/ 
technologies, which results the Big N firms being able to serve more risky clients 
(Catanach, et al., 2011). While most studies have primarily focused on audit firms’ 
purposeful client portfolio management based on trade-offs between engagement 
profit and expected engagement loss (i.e., litigation cost, reputation loss etc.), 
little is known about how individual audit partners’ characteristics affect the client 
acceptance and continuance decisions. In addition, agency theory assumes that 
audit partners are homogeneous within a particular group, so that the largest 
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auditors are essentially the same in terms of quality, appetite for risk, etc. (Francis, 
2011). However, such a narrow assumption is likely to discount potential 
individual differences. 
A limited number of experimental and field studies provide some insights 
into how individual audit partners make client acceptance decisions. In general, 
research suggests that auditors’ client acceptance decisions are affected by 
perceived litigation risk (Huss & Jacob, 1991), clients’ financial conditions 
(Johnstone 2000; Pratt & Stice, 1994) and management integrity (Cohen & Hanno, 
2000; Johnstone 2001). Research also indicates that while client’s business risk 
and audit risk are inversely related to the likelihood of an auditor’s acceptance 
decision, auditors differ in terms of which risk components are relatively more 
important for their client acceptance decisions (Eppa and Messier 2007; Gendron 
2001; Johnstone 2001) and applying risk adaptation strategies (Johnstone 2000; 
Johnstone and Bedard 2003). In an experimental study, Johnstone (2000) found 
that auditors made client acceptance decisions based on clients’ financial status 
and internal control systems but did not accept those considered as high-risk 
clients. However, a field study by Johnstone and Bedard (2003) found that risk 
management strategies such as assigning industry experts or increasing audit 
scopes moderated the negative relation between risky clients and auditors’ 
likelihood of acceptance. While prior research shows that individual auditors 
differ in evaluating and weighing risk factors, they provide limited insight into the 
extent to which auditors’ individual characteristics are reflected in client 
acceptance decisions.  
In the next section, we develop hypotheses based on gender-based 
differences in risk attitudes and cognitive information processing, with linking to 
client portfolio decisions. Further, we will extend the previous research on gender 
differences in auditing context by leading the focus of analysis to situational 
factors.  
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2.3 Gender Differences in Risk Assessment and Information Processing 
Under the so-called “selectivity hypothesis”, research shows that males and 
females differ in information processing styles (Meyers-Levy 1986); in this view, 
females are more comprehensive processors than males, so they employ most of 
the available information in forming their judgement. Males, however, tend to rely 
on heuristic devices and strongly represented informational cues, and their 
judgement is marked by simplified strategies that minimize cognitive effort.
3
 A 
number of experimental studies confirm that gender differences in information 
processing strategies could influence auditors’ judgements in various tasks (e.g. 
Chung and Monroe 2001; O'Donnell and Johnson 2001; Gold et al. 2009). For 
instance, Chung and Monroe (2001) examined the effect of auditor gender and 
task complexity on accuracy, finding that female auditors achieved greater 
accuracy than male auditors in more complex inventory valuation tasks. 
O'Donnell and Johnson (2001) focused on task efficiency and reported that female 
auditors spent significantly more time than male auditors in completing an 
analytical procedure task in the context of a low level of client risk.  In their 
experimental study, Gold et al. (2009) show that females’ comparatively lower 
risk tolerance levels are associated with a need for more detailed information 
before making judgements. Hence, the different cognitive patterns between males 
and females also appear to accommodate gender differences in risk-taking 
behaviours.  
It is widely acknowledged stereotype that females are more risk averse than 
males.
4
 Research suggests that, to a large extent, gender differences observed in 
risk-taking behaviours are driven by differences in perception of risks and 
whether a decision-maker stresses potential losses or gains in the decision-making 
                                           
3
 Heuristic devices represent an individual’s tendency to rely on the probability of occurrence, 
previous experiences in similar contexts or readily available information when making judgements 
(Meyers-Levy, 1986). 
4
 For example, research in psychology (Byrnes et al. 1999), social science (Christman et al. 2007) 
and gender studies (Lyonette and Crompton 2008) support this contention.  
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context, a process known as focus framing. Risk and return trade-offs are 
cognitive processes in which perceived risks and expected benefits are 
subjectively assessed and valued (Borghans et al. 2009). Using the risk-return 
framework, females are found to put greater emphasis on potential loss or risk 
while males are likely to put emphasis on expected benefits (e.g. Christman et al. 
2007; Borghans et al. 2009). This predisposition to focus on loss or gain is 
observed in many domains, but especially in financial decision-making contexts 
where the task is socially viewed as masculine
5
 (e.g. Powell and Ansic 1997; 
Olsen and Cox 2001; Speelman et al. 2013; Hohnisch et al. 2014). Likewise, Carr 
and Steele (2010) note that females become more risk-averse in investment 
decision-making compared to males in a context in which they were exposed to 
the stereotype that males are better at investment decisions than females.  
From this perspective, the audit firm context does appear to trigger gender 
stereotypes, as female auditors are in a numerical minority and the auditor 
stereotype is positively linked to males (Anderson-Gough et al. 2005; Kornberger 
et al. 2010; Hardies 2011). Recent literature notes that the gendered nature of 
audit firms is perpetuated through informal organisational practices such as 
largely male-dominated networking practices that are often subtle yet pervasive 
within an organisation (Anderson-Gough et al. 2006; Lupu 2012). Female and 
male auditors thus might have meaningfully different experiences within 
seemingly identical audit contexts; consequently, gender differences are likely to 
be observed in assessing engagement risk. Prior empirical research reported that 
companies with female CFOs are less likely to issue debt (Huang and Kisgen 
2013), are associated with reduced aggressiveness in the area of taxation (Francis 
et al. 2015) and have more income-decreasing discretionary accruals (Barua et al. 
2010; Peni and Vähämaa 2010), suggesting that female executives are relatively 
                                           
5
 For instance, behavioural economic studies have documented that female investors tend to 
overestimate small probabilities of losing and are more sensitive to ambiguity, leading to their 
holding portfolios with less volatile returns than males (Christman et al. 2007; Olsen and Cox 
2001; Speelman et al. 2013) 
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less tolerant of risk and therefore adopt more conservative accounting strategies. 
Similarly, recent audit research demonstrates that companies audited by female 
auditors are associated with less opportunistic earnings management (Niskanen et 
al. 2011), intensive audit efforts (Ittonen and Peni 2012) and receive more GCOs 
(Hardies et al. 2014). 
As discussed above, client acceptance decisions involve the engagement 
audit partners’ evaluations of expected returns and costs. On the one hand, client 
retention can improve their career advancement and improve their places in 
partnership or compensation schemes (Knechel et al. 2013; Fu et al. 2015). On the 
other hand, taking on risky clients could lead to potential litigation, so auditors’ 
personal reputations are at stake (Shu 2000; Bell et al. 2002; Krishnan and Francis 
2002); two auditors in very similar situations could thus come to different audit 
engagement decisions, depending on how each weighs the expected returns and 
costs or risks associated with a particular client. Females’ detailed information 
processing may lead them to be more aware of the inherent risk implied in clients 
(O'Donnell and Johnson 2001; Chung and Monroe 2001; Gold et al. 2009). 
Alternatively, female auditors’ greater emphasis on negative outcomes may lead 
them to evaluate the potential costs as much higher than male auditors. In either 
case, it is expected that female auditors are less likely to engage with risky clients. 
Male audit partners, on the other hand, may be more likely to overlook clients’ 
inherent risk because of their tendency to employ simplified information 
processing. Additionally, male auditors’ positively biased risk evaluation may 
lead them to put greater emphasis on potential revenue than on downside risk with 
prospective clients. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Client portfolios of female auditors are on average less risky than male 
auditors. 
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2.4 The Level of Engagement Risk in Client Acceptance Decision Context 
Although gender differences are context-specific, the majority of the 
literature supports differences between females’ and males’ information 
processing patterns and their attitudes toward risk. However, some researchers 
have posited that females’ tendency to be more risk-averse than males warrants 
further, more nuanced investigation. According to Hyde's (2005) meta-analysis, 
which examines the effect sizes of gender differences, females and males are in 
fact much more similar in terms of outlook. Hyde’s further investigation into 
potential moderators showed that gender difference in risk perception is not 
identical across different ethnic groups. Similarly, Nelson (2015) examined 
statistically significant research in a meta-analysis of 35 scholarly works in 
economics, finance and decision science. Testing the substantive significance of 
these studies, she found that results were more mixed and overlapped to a greater 
extent than first inferred.
6
 Nelson (2015) suggests that it is likely that significant 
gender differences are apparent only at the extremes of risk-taking decisions.  
Within the auditing context, the level of risk is a significant factor in 
determining individual auditors’ differences. Auditors’ client acceptance decisions 
not only involve evaluating risk based on the evidence but also require auditors to 
make professional judgements using risk management strategies to determine 
whether any identified risks are acceptable (APESB, 2010; AUASB, 2011). The 
professional literature also suggests that high-risk engagement calls on audit 
partners’ professional judgement to plan or design audit procedures that are 
tailored to those high-risk clients and thus differ from the standardised audit 
manual and process (D'Aquila et al. 2010). Therefore, a high level of engagement 
risk is an important situational factor that may magnify the differences in client 
portfolios between female and male audit partners. A survey study of professional 
investment managers by Olsen and Cox (2001) concludes that while gender 
                                           
6
 Standardized differences in means are less than one standard deviation, and the degree of 
overlap between male and female distributions generally exceeds 80%. 
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differences in risk perception give rise to different portfolio recommendations for 
clients, these differences are most significant for assets and portfolios at risk 
extremes. Prior research also shows that while large auditors are generally 
reluctant to associate with financially risky clients as measured by financial 
distress, accounting ratios or market risk measurements, auditors differ in 
applying risk management strategies in the high-risk engagement context 
(Krishnan and Francis 2002; Johnstone and Bedard 2004a; Choi et al. 2004).  
Given females’ sensitivity to ambiguity and negative outcomes, it is more 
likely that female auditors evaluate high-risk clients as riskier and judge it more 
costly to mitigate those risks than males do. In addition, male auditors’ tendency 
to focus on gain may emphasize client retention incentives and lead them to 
applying risk management strategies. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: The negative relation between female audit partners and riskiness of 
the clienteles depends on high-risk engagement. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The sample for this study consists of the firms listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) from 2013 to 2014. Data on listed companies with 
financial information is sourced from the Morningstar database. Data on audit fees 
and engagement partners are retrieved from the Connect 4 database, and cross-
checked with the SIRCA and Morningstar databases for confirmation.  
Australian listed companies are required to disclose auditor remuneration in 
the financial statements as stipulated by Australian Accounting Standards AASB 
1054 (AASB, 2011). The disclosure should include nature of all services (audit 
and non-audit services) and amounts for each type of services performed by each 
auditor during the financial reporting period (AASB, 2011). Furthermore, 
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Australian Auditing Standards ASA700 requires the engagement partner to 
disclose their name with signature in the audit report (AUASB, 2013). 
Accordingly, data on audit fees and the engagement auditor name are hand-
collected from financial statements and audit reports. Auditors’ gender is further 
identified from the audit firms’ websites based on their full name. In cases where 
auditor gender is not provided on the company’s website, auditors’ gender is 
found on social network sites (e.g. LinkedIn) and media releases from audit firms. 
The initial sample of 3,797 firm-year observations is obtained from the 
Morningstar database. Following prior research, companies from the financial 
sectors (two digit GICS code 40) are excluded from the sample to address their 
different reporting requirements (Xu et al. 2013). Companies with incomplete 
financial data are also removed, resulting in a sample of 3,088 observations with 
financial information. After reviewing the annual reports, companies that provide 
only preliminary financial reports, foreign registrants, companies with missing 
audit fee data, and companies whose functional currency is not Australian Dollars 
are further excluded. Finally, companies with double audit partners, no audit 
partner names in the audit reports, as well as non-identifiable audit partners’ 
gender are dropped from the sample. This elimination process yielded a final 
sample of 2,767 firm-year observations representing 1,488 Australian listed 
companies. The sample selection procedure is outlined in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
3.2 Research Model 
Client Acceptance Model 
The proposed hypotheses were tested by comparing the risk profile of client 
portfolios between female and male audit partners. Prior research suggests that 
financially stressed clients are associated with the likelihood of material 
misstatement occurring in the financial statement (audit risk), as they are more 
likely to have incentives to manage earnings (Krishnan and Francis 2002; 
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Gaeremynck et al. 2008; Schroeder and Hogan 2013). Similarly, research on audit 
firms’ client portfolio changes and auditor resignation demonstrates that clients’ 
poor financial condition increases auditor judgements of litigation risk (Simunic 
and Stein 1990; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Johnstone 2000; Krishnan and 
Francis 2002; Choi et al. 2004), thereby also increasing auditors’ perceived 
engagement risk. Accordingly, the dependent variable, engagement risk 
(ENGMRISK), reflects indicators of client firms’ riskiness. Accordingly, the 
proposed hypotheses were tested by comparing the financial risk profile of client 
portfolios between female and male audit partners. As a quality control system, 
the partner in charge is required to review the relationships with existing clients 
periodically, typically on an annual basis and accordingly the newly accepted 
client firms are subject to auditors’ retention decisions for the subsequent year 
(e.g., ASA 220 para 15; ISQC 1). The major difference between two decisions lies 
in the extent of knowledge/ information which auditors possess about the clients 
that are being evaluated. Nonetheless the process by which auditors evaluate the 
engagement risk for the new and existing clients are similar in terms of gathering 
client-related information and evaluating the overall business risk
7
. Hence, we use 
the pool of client portfolios (existing and new clients) for each group, female and 
male auditors. If systematic differences between female and male auditors (e.g. 
risk perception and information processing) influence their judgements (Ittonen 
and Peni 2012; Ittonen and Vähämaa 2013; Gul et al. 2013; Hardies et al. 2015), 
such differences should be reflected in their client portfolios. 
First, to test whether average female audit partners’ clienteles are less risky 
than male audit partners’ clienteles (H1), the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model is used. Second, the quantile regression is estimated to test 
whether auditors’ gender-related difference is prominent in the high-risk 
                                           
7
 In terms of regulation, the difference between the two types of decisions for new clients and existing clients 
is not highlighted and both are considered as a whole; see Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and 
Reviews of Financial Reports and Other Financial Information, and Other Assurance Engagements pursuant 
to section 227B of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. 
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engagement context (H2) by fitting the 20
th
 quantile lines in the upper or lower 
tails of the distribution. 
In order to test whether average female audit partners’ clienteles are less 
risky than male audit partners’ clienteles (H1), the following Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression model is estimated based on the pooled sample: 
 
ENGMRISK i = α0 + ß1 FEMALEi +ß2 LnTAi + ß3 LnAGEi + ß4 BIG4i +   ß5 
LnCLIENTi + ß6 FEERATIOi + ß7 PSPEi + ß8 FSPEi +    ß9 
INDUSTRY_DUMMYi + εi 
 
 
(1) 
Table 2 summarizes the dependent variables, variable of interest, and control 
variables used in the tests. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Dependent Variables 
Following Choi et al. (2004), a summary measure of financial distress and 
two financial ratios are used as the proxy variables for client firms’ riskiness.8 
The summary measure of financial distress (PBANK) is the probability of 
bankruptcy score based on the adjusted Zmijewski (1984) model that includes 
financial leverage, return on assets, and liquidity ratios as dimensions in 
prediction of bankruptcy
9
. Accurate prediction of business failure is difficult as 
                                           
8
 Choi et al. (2004) investigate whether Big 6 audit firms purposefully manage their client portfolios in 
respond to the changing litigation risk (high vs. low) by comparing client riskiness during the sample period. 
Client risk was measured using three summary measures of financial distress, including Altman Z-score, 
modified Altman Z-score, and Zmijewski’s probability of bankruptcy score. As noted by Stice (1991, p. 521), 
various financial distress prediction models available in the literature “do not statistically differ in their ability 
to predict business failure”. 
 
9
  Auditing research has used the Zmijewski (1984) bankruptcy score as a measure of financial distress of 
company receiving going-concern opinions (for example, Krishnan and Francis, 2002; Carey and Simnett, 
2006; Geiger and Rama, 2006; Carey and Kortum, 2012) or auditors’ litigation risk (for example, Jones and 
Raghunandan, 1998; Krishnan, 1999; Choi et al., 2004). 
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shown in previous studies on auditors’ going concern opinions and default 
prediction literature (Hopwood et al. 1989; Hay et al. 2014), yet bankruptcy 
models help to identify those companies in financial difficulty. Hence, a large 
proportion of financially distressed firms (proxied by PBANK) in an auditor’s 
client portfolio evidently indicates the auditor’s greater risk tolerance level in 
client acceptance. As higher values represent a higher probability of financial 
distress, a negative association between PBANK and FEMALE is expected.  
The proportion of net income in relation to total assets (ROA) indicates the 
clients’ ability to generate profits and is widely used to capture client business risk 
(e.g. Choi et al. 2004; Johnstone and Bedard 2004a; Hay et al. 2007; Khalil et al. 
2011; Hardies et al. 2014). ROA reflects the managements’ efficiency in using 
their assets to generate profits, and accordingly, is closely link to managers’ 
compensation or evaluation of performance (Kothari et al. 2005; Warfield 2005). 
Low return on assets ratio may create greater pressures on managements, which in 
turn leads to increased audit risk as reflected in potential misstatement in financial 
reporting.  
The proportion of inventory and receivables to total assets (INVREC) 
captures audit risk because these accounts require complex measurement and 
subjective judgement in estimating their values, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of misstatement in financial reporting (Krishnan and Krishnan 1996; Stice 1991; 
Shu 2000; Fargher and Jiang 2008; Khalil et al. 2011). As higher values indicate a 
riskier client firm, a negative coefficient for FEMALE is expected.  
Variable of interest 
The main test variable, FEMALE, is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a 
signing partner is female in year t and 0 otherwise. 
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Control variables 
Following prior literature (e.g. Johnstone and Bedard 2004a; Hardies et al. 
2014) characteristics of individual audit partners, audit firms and clients are 
shown to have potential confounding effects and are included as control variables.  
With regard to client-related attributes, the natural logarithm of total assets 
(LnTA) and the natural logarithm of number of listed years in the Australian 
Securities Exchange (LnAGE) are included to control for client firms’ size and 
age, respectively. As younger and smaller firms are likely to have more 
uncertainty and encounter financial distress (Carey and Simnett 2006; Francis and 
Yu 2009), positive coefficients on LnTA and LnAGE are expected.  
The auditor characteristics are controlled at both the firm level and the 
individual partner level. BIG4 is included to control for the size of auditor. Prior 
research provides mixed evidence on the risk tolerance of Big 4 audit firms. Big 4 
auditors might be able to accept high-risk clients due to more audit resources (Shu 
2000; Choi et al. 2004).  However, research also shows that public audit firms 
actively manage their client portfolios to reduce litigation risk and maintain their 
reputation, which should be associated with low-risk clienteles (Johnstone and 
Bedard 2003; Krishnan 2003; Schroeder and Hogan 2013). Given the mixed 
evidence, whether or not Big 4 audit firms take on riskier clients is unclear. Hence, 
no prediction is made on the direction of the relationship between BIG4 and client 
riskiness. 
LnCLIENT, measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of audit clients 
in the audit partner’s client portfolios, is included as an audit partner level control 
(Gul et al. 2012; Zerni 2012; Goodwin and Wu 2015; Sundgren and Svanström 
2014). It is argued that a large client base may decrease the amount of time and 
audit efforts the audit partner needs to invest for each assignment, thereby 
adversely affect audit quality (Fich and Shivdasani 2007; Gul et al. 2012; 
Sundgren and Svanström 2014). However, using the Australian data, Goodwin 
and Wu (2015) found no significant relationship between audit partner busyness 
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and the likelihood to issue a going concern opinion. Accordingly, there is no 
specific directional expectation between LnCLIENT and clients’ riskiness. PSPE 
and FSPE are used to control for industry specialists at the audit partner and audit 
firm level, respectively. Extant studies show that client firms audited by industry 
specialists generally have higher audit quality compared to firms audited by non-
specialist audit firms due to the associated high reputation cost and client-specific 
knowledge (Balsam et al. 2003; Knechel et al. 2007; Cenker and Nagy 2008; Chi 
and Chin 2011). In addition, research suggests that auditors are more likely to 
accept high-risk clients when they believe they have the industry expertise to help 
mitigate the risks associated with the clients (Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Irving 
and Walker 2012). Following prior studies (Chi and Chin 2011; Zerni 2012; 
Hardies et al. 2014), the audit partner is defined as an industry specialist (PSPE) if 
the audit partner is top-ranked or second-ranked in the industry based on the audit 
partner’s market share using the amount of aggregated audit fees within an 
industry in year t. Similarly, audit firm industry specialization (FSPE) is based on 
an audit firm’s annual market shares measured by the sum of audit fees within an 
industry. An auditor firm is defined as an industry specialist if the audit firm is the 
largest or second-largest audit service supplier in the industry (Ittonen et al. 2010; 
Zerni 2012; Hardies et al. 2014). Potential to provide non-audit services may 
affect the auditors’ judgement in assessing the engagement risk by increasing their 
threshold to accept high-risk clients. Accordingly, the ratio of non-audit fees to 
the total of audit and non-audit fees (FEERATIO) collected from the individual 
client firms are controlled for in the model (Asare et al. 2005; Carey and Simnett 
2006). Finally, an indicator variable for industry (two-digit GICS code) is 
included in the model to control for the possible industry effect on audit partners’ 
client acceptance decisions due to the different level of riskiness and complexity 
associated with particular industries (Johnstone and Bedard 2004b).  
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Quantile Regression Model 
A Quantile Regression (QR) method introduced by Koenker and Bassett 
(1978) is used to test whether auditors’ gender-related difference is prominent in 
the high-risk engagement context (H2).
 
The QR analysis allows an examination of 
covariate effects at various cut points along the distribution of the dependent 
variable. For example, quantiles of each engagement risk measure (DV) for a 
specific client firm represents its relative level of engagement risk compared to 
the entire set of firm observations. In other words, the QR estimates the 
conditioning effect of X on Y at various points of distribution. This is particularly 
relevant to the test on H2, because my interest resides precisely in the upper tails 
of a distribution (high-risk engagement context) where auditors’ gender 
differences are expected to be more pronounced.  As to the research question, the 
quantile regression takes the following form:  
 
Quant θ (yi) = α + ßθ FEMALE i + ∑ ßθ Controli + ui        (2) 
 
Where α and ui represent the intercept and error term respectively; Quant θ 
(yi) is the dependent variable at quantile θ. Using the median value of y for the 
entire sample, where θ = 0.5, companies with y greater (less) than y in the 50th 
quantile can be classified as more (less) risky clients. In their study examining 
changes in the riskiness of Big Six audit firms’ client portfolios, Choi et al. (2004) 
use the QR with 10th percentile cutoffs of the client risk measures proxy for the 
riskiest client sup-group. In this study, the 20th percentile cutoff (top 20 percent 
of the riskiest client subgroup) is used to define the high-risk engagement context.  
While the exact definition of the riskiest client group is indefinite, this study 
finds it appropriate to use 20th percentile cutoffs due to the lack of variability in 
the main test variable (FEMALE) present across the three different dependent 
variables at the smallest decile (10th percentile). The 50th quantile (median) is 
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used as a reference point, which represents the ordinary engagement risk context. 
The effect of auditors’ gender in the high-risk context is estimated by fitting the 
20th quantile lines in the upper or lower tails of the distribution. For example, 
higher values of PBANK and INVREC (upper tail) indicate higher risk whereas 
lower values of ROA indicate the relatively higher risk clients (lower tail). 
Accordingly, the 80th quantile for PBANK and INVREC, and 20th quantile for 
ROA represent the high-risk engagement risk. The variable of interest (FEMALE) 
and a set of control variables used in quantile regression are the same as for the 
OLS model. The standard error of the coefficient in the quantile regression model 
is estimated with the bootstrap method, consistent with prior studies using the 
quantile regression analysis (e.g. Choi et al. 2004; Li and Hwang 2011; Solakoglu 
2013; Lee and Li 2016). 
Given the nature of quantile regression, which divides the data sample into 
defined deciles or percentiles, the bootstrap method enables more robust 
estimation of the regression effect by making changes in bootstrap sample size 
relative to the actual data sample size (Koenker 2005). This is a widely used 
method when conducting quantile regression, as it is useful even when the actual 
sample distribution is not systematic and is valid under many forms of 
heterogeneity ( Li 2009; Solakoglu 2013; Chi et al. 2015; Lee and Li 2016).  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the 
models as well as the descriptive statistics for the sub-samples of female and male 
audit partners. The full sample comprises 2,767 firm-year observations for 
Australian listed companies in 2013 and 2014. The p-values for comparison t-tests 
between means of the two sub-samples are reported in the last column.  
[Insert Table 3] 
The average PBANK is -1.546, which suggests that many companies in the 
sample exhibit less bankruptcy risk. However, the average ROA is -0.499, 
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indicating that many sample companies were also subject to the economic 
downturn during the sample period and thus experienced some financial difficulty. 
The average (median) ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets is 0.153 
(0.062). The number of clients (LnCLIENT) of an auditor varies between 1 and 
31, with the average (median) number of clients approximately 8 (5). Of all firm-
year observations, 8.46 percent (N = 234) of the companies were audited by 
female audit partners, which is consistent with previous research using Australian 
data (Hossain and Chapple 2012)
10
 and 37.19 percent (N = 1,029) of the 
companies were audited by BIG 4 audit firms.  
Table 3, Panel B shows that, on average, clients of female auditors are less 
risky than clients of male auditors; companies audited by female auditors are less 
likely to be financially distressed (PBANK: -3.190 versus -1.395, p = 0.000), are 
more profitable (ROA: -0.201 versus -0.526, p = 0.000) with a higher inventory 
and receivables ratio (INVREC: 0.179 versus 0.151, p = 0.038). Clients of female 
auditors are significantly larger in size (LnTA: 17.526 versus 16.994, p = 0.000) 
with greater number of years listed at ASX (LnAGE: 2.484 versus 2.385, p = 
0.093) and have a higher percentage of non-audit service fees compared with total 
audit and non-audit service fees charged from the client (FEERATIO: 0.184 
versus 0.138, p = 0.002).  
In terms of audit partner characteristics, female auditors are, on average, 
more likely to work for BIG 4 audit firms (BIG4: 58.97 percent versus 35.18 
percent, p = 0.000), industry specialist audit firms (FSPE: 27.78 percent versus 
17.73 percent, p = 0.000), and have a significantly smaller client base (LnCLIENT: 
0.950 versus 1.711, p = 0.000) compared to male auditors. The percentage of 
female audit partners who are industry specialists (PSPE) is not statistically 
different from male audit partners (p = 0.529).  
                                           
10
 Hossain and Chapple (2012) study the impact of audit partners’ gender on audit quality using Australian 
data over the period from 2003 to 2009. They show that female audit engagement increases during their 
sample period, starting from a low of 3.87 percent in 2003 to 6.75 percent in 2009. 
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Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix among variables used in the 
models. The test variable FEMALE is negatively (positively) associated with 
PBANK (ROA), suggesting that clients with female audit partners are less likely 
to be risky. The correlation of FEMALE is positive with INVREC, indicating that 
clients of female auditors have a higher level of inventories and receivables. All 
control variables are also significantly correlated with the dependent variables, 
except for LnAGE and PSPE. LnAGE and PSPE are not significantly associated 
with dependent variables, ROA and PBANK, respectively. The strongest 
correlations between independent variables are found between BIG4 and LnTA 
(0.517) and between FSPE and BIG4 (0.602). These correlations indicate that BIG 
4 audit firms are more likely to be industry leaders in terms of aggregated audit 
fees and their client size tends to be larger, consistent with prior studies (Cenker 
and Nagy 2008). As shown in the last column of collinearity diagnostics, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) are not greater than 2.97, suggesting that multicollinearity 
is not an issue for the subsequent analyses.  
[Insert Table 4] 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Main Test – OLS and QR 
Panel A of Table 5 provides the multivariate results examining whether 
clients of female audit partners are less risky than clients of male audit partners 
(H1). Columns (1) - (3) report pooled OLS regression estimates, with PBANK, 
ROA and INVREC used as the dependent variable, respectively. Following prior 
research, robust standard errors are computed by using the Huber/White sandwich 
estimator to address the “mutual dependence of observations from the same 
individual auditor” (Hardies et al. 2015).  
[Insert Table 5] 
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The coefficients of FEMALE are in the expected direction when Model 1 is 
estimated on all three individual dependent variables. In Column (1) where 
PBANK is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient of FEMALE is negative 
and significant (p = 0.000), indicating that companies with female auditors are on 
average less risky than companies with male auditors. In Column (2), using ROA 
as the dependent variable, the coefficient of FEMALE is positive and significant 
(p = 0.012). The magnitude of the coefficient on FEMALE suggests that 
companies audited by female audit partners showed significantly higher 
profitability compared to companies audited by male audit partners (p = 0.012). In 
the third Column when using INVREC as a dependent variable, the coefficient of 
FEMALE is negative but not significant (p = 0.600).   
With respect to client characteristics, results show that larger and younger 
firms are less likely to be financially distressed (-1.739, p = 0.000) and show 
better performance in terms of profitability (0.349, p = 0.000). Companies audited 
by BIG 4 auditors are more likely to be financially distressed (1.950, p = 0.000) 
and less profitable in their business (-0.370, p = 0.000) compared to the 
companies audited by non-BIG 4 auditors. This is consistent with the argument 
that BIG 4 audit firms have more resources and technology that enable them to 
serve relatively riskier clients (Shu 2000; Krishnan 2003; Schroeder and Hogan 
2013). Likewise, companies with industry specialized audit partners are more 
likely to be financially distressed and less profitable (2.750, p = 0.000 and -0.448, 
p = 0.001, respectively), indicating that assigning an audit partner with industry 
expertise is a typical risk management strategy for high-risk engagement, and 
therefore clients of industry specialised auditors are more likely to be risky which 
confers with prior research (Johnstone and Bedard 2004a; Asare et al. 2005; 
Cenker and Nagy 2008). There is, however, weak evidence at audit firm level that 
companies audited by industry specialised audit firms differ from companies with 
non-industry specialised audit firms; significant relation is only found when 
INVREC is used as a dependent variable (FSPE; -0.033, p = 0.008). In addition, 
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the coefficient on FEERATIO is not significant across all the columns, suggesting 
that the potential to provide the non-audit service may not be the main 
consideration when auditors make the client acceptance decision, consistent with 
prior research (Asare et al. 2005).  
Panel B in Table 5 reports the estimation results of the quantile regressions 
with PBANK, ROA, and INVREC used as the dependent variable, respectively. 
In the first column where PBANK is used as the dependent variable, a significant 
negative association between Female and PBANK is found at both median (p = 
0.015) and high-risk level (p = 0.008), indicating clients of female auditors exhibit 
less financial distress. However, the magnitude of gender difference becomes 
larger at the 80th quantile when compared to the 50th quantile (-0.358 versus -
0.658). In support of H2, the effect of auditors’ gender difference becomes more 
prominent among the high-risk client group.  
Similarly, positive association between Female and ROA are found at both 
median and high-risk level (p = 0.005). The greater gender difference (coefficient) 
is also found at the high-risk quantile compared to the median quantile (0.147 
versus 0.058). This result suggests that the effect of auditors’ gender difference 
becomes more pronounced among the high-risk client group compared to clients 
in the ordinary (median) risk context, thereby supporting H2. 
In Column 3 when INVREC is used as the dependent variable, the results 
show a negative association between FEMALE and INVREC, but this effect is 
only significant at the high-risk quantile (-0.002, p = 0.825 versus -0.040, p = 
0.032, respectively). Both coefficient magnitude and statistical significance 
further support H2, with the effect of auditors’ gender difference becoming more 
prominent among the high-risk client group.  
4.2 Additional Analysis 
To test the robustness of the above results in Table 5, a number of additional 
tests are conducted. First, the results are examined to be robust for the balanced 
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panel data. With balanced panel data, those companies that appear only either in 
2013 or 2014 are excluded from the sample (N = 209) to reduce the individual 
heterogeneity across the different firms.  We further remove all observations of 
audit partners (N = 614) that appear only either 2013 or 2014 to reduce the 
individual audit partners’ differences. The results of OLS regression and quantile 
regression analyses for balanced panel data are reported in Table 6 and Table 7.  
[Insert Table 6] 
[Insert Table 7] 
Overall, previously reported findings from the pooled sample remain 
essentially unchanged. Table 6 and Table 7 show that except INVREC (-0.006, p 
= 0.620), clients of female auditors are less likely to be financially distressed and 
are likely to be more profitable. Collectively, the results support H1: that female 
audit partners’ client portfolios are, on average, less risky than male audit partners. 
Consistent with the above quantile regression analysis, the effect of auditors’ 
gender difference becomes more pronounced among the high-risk client group, 
suggesting that female audit partners’ less risky client portfolios depend on a 
specific high-risk engagement context (H2).  
Second, consistent results are observed when the subsample of 2013 and 
2014 financial years are separately used as reported in Table 8. Findings of yearly 
regression analysis primarily confirm those results in Table 5 with minor 
exception. For instance, Panel A in Table 8 shows that the coefficient for ROA is 
positive but insignificant in the 2014 subsample (p = 0.325). Other results are 
comparable to those documented in Table 5.  
Third, we compare the risk profile of the sub-portfolio (newly accepted 
clients vs. continuing clients) between female and male audit partners. Although a 
similar procedure is conducted by auditors, some researchers believe that 
acceptable level of overall engagement risk should be different for accepting new 
clients and retention decision as auditors are more informed about the client 
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business and internal control systems etc. from conducting the audit in the prior 
period (e.g., Johnstone and Bedards 2003). Accordingly, we split the sample for 
the new client and continuing client. There were 1,277 firm-year observations for 
which we possessed auditor identity data for two consecutive years; 972 
companies were audited by the same audit partners in 2013 and 2014 while 305 
companies switched their auditors. The results for each sub-portfolio are reported 
in Table 9. Overall, the results of the sub-group regression analysis are 
comparable to the main results. Both newly accepted and continuing clients with 
female auditors are less likely to be financially distressed and are likely to be 
more profitable but have more risky accounts. Panel B in Table 9 reports the 
estimation results of the quantile regressions. Both coefficient magnitude and 
statistical significance indicate that the association between gender of the audit 
partners and client riskiness is particularly strong in the newly accepted clients 
group.   
Finally, additional analysis yields a number of new insights into the role of 
the size of audit firms (BIG 4 vs. non-BIG 4) and industry specialized auditors 
(FEMALE x PSPE).  
Table 10 exhibits the results for additional regressions for the subsamples of 
BIG 4 and non-BIG 4 auditors. Overall, the results of the main tests in the present 
study are consistent only with the subsample of non-BIG 4 audit firms; there were 
no significant effects of auditor gender in the BIG 4 subsample. While this finding 
is somewhat unexpected, one possibility is that the BIG 4 firms differ from other 
firms in terms of the extent to which the decision context is structured. Large 
public accounting firms are required to establish appropriate policies and 
procedures for making client acceptance decisions; research also suggests that 
large audit firms actively manage their client portfolios as a risk containment 
strategy (Johnstone et al. 2004; Stimpson 2008). Accordingly, BIG 4 auditors may 
be subject to more structured client acceptance procedures such as formal criteria, 
hierarchical review and additional approvals than other auditors, thereby leading 
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to more standardized decisions. Technology-enabled decision mechanisms for 
auditors’ client acceptance decisions such as KPMG’s KRisk (Bell et al. 2002) 
and the acceptance and retention committees (ARCs) implemented by several BIG 
4 audit firms (Stimpson 2008) exemplify these trends.  
With regard to the contingent effect of industry-specific auditors measured 
both at the individual auditor (FEMALE x PSPE) and audit firm levels (FEMALE 
x FSPE), the results are reported in Table 11 and Table 12 respectively. The 
results reveal that clients of specialized female auditors measured at the individual 
auditor level are more likely to be risky relative to those of other auditors and that 
this phenomenon is exacerbated in the high-risk engagement context. However, 
clients of female firm-level auditor industry specialists do not differ from those 
with male firm-level auditor industry specialists.  
The relationship between auditor specialists and clientele riskiness is 
consistent with earlier case studies on client acceptance decisions (Johnstone and 
Bedard 2004a), demonstrating that assigning industry specialist personnel may 
mitigate high-risk clients; those clients which might otherwise be unacceptable are 
accepted by audit firms depending on the availability of specialized personnel 
(Johnstone and Bedard 2004a). The results in terms of audit-firm level specialists 
are also consistent with previous research on the effect of auditor industry 
specialists on audit quality (Chi and Chin 2011), which shows that firm-level 
auditor specialists alone are not significantly associated with a higher propensity 
of issuing a going concern opinion (GCO), but that clients at the individual-level 
of auditor specialists are likely to receive a GCO, thereby suggesting more 
intensive audit quality. While the study highlights the importance of recognizing 
individual auditors’ differences and confirms that individual auditors are hardly 
homogeneous even within the same industry-specialized audit firm, the reasons 
why clients of female specialized auditors are riskier remains unclear. One 
possible explanation for why clients of female specialized auditors are riskier is 
offered by the organisational context. The very implicit stereotypes which may 
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make female auditors concerned about being judged on the basis of their gender 
rather than their professional identity further inhibit female auditors’ confidence 
in client acceptance decision-making. Therefore, it is plausible that female 
auditors feel particularly vulnerable if they make mistakes and hence may only 
accept risky clients when they are highly confident that they have the appropriate 
skills and competencies to serve those clients. In other words, deep knowledge 
and technology associated with certain clients’ particular industries would drive 
female specialized auditors to act more like their male counterparts, leading to no 
gender differences. Supporting this view, while males’ risk-taking propensity is 
well documented, some findings of behavioural finance research suggest that 
females do take as much risk as males, or even accept more risk than males, as 
long as they believe that they have superior investment skills (Barber and Odean 
2001; Meyers-Levy and Loken 2015).  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates whether and how auditor gender affects auditors’ 
client acceptance decisions. Building on social identity theory and prior evidence 
of the potential effects of auditor gender on the audit process and audit quality, in 
addition to the negative association between client-related risk factors and 
auditors’ client acceptance decisions, this study posits that female and male 
auditors may differ systematically in gathering client-related information and 
evaluating any risks identified. Specifically, based on gender differences in 
cognitive information processing and risk attitudes, we hypothesize that female 
auditors on average choose less risky clients for their client portfolios than male 
auditors (H1). Further, we anticipate that such negative association between 
female auditors and clientele riskiness will be exacerbated in a high-risk 
engagement context (H2).  
Tests based on client financial characteristics - a summary measure of 
financial distress (PBANK) along with disaggregated accounting ratios such as 
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profitability (ROA) and the risky account structure (INVREC) - indicate that 
female auditors have, on average, less risky clients in their client portfolios 
compared to male auditors, as predicted. Consistent with H2, the negative relation 
between female auditors and the level of engagement risk are exacerbated in high-
risk engagement conditions; companies with female auditors have fewer problems 
associated with financial distress, profitability and the complex structure of 
accounts, and these relations are more pronounced among the riskiest group than 
the median of the sample.  
The main results of this study support and extend prior research on auditor 
gender differences in the audit process and generation of audit reports, and 
potential effects of gender stereotypes in the decision-making context.  
First, consistent with prior research on the effect of gender differences on 
auditor judgements and audit reports (e.g. Niskanen et al. 2011; Ittonen and 
Vähämaa 2013; Hardies et al. 2014), this study provides evidence that auditor 
gender differences do influence the evaluation of engagement risk and thus client 
acceptance decisions. In addition, we demonstrates the importance of context in 
examining gender differences, supporting prior research on gender stereotypes in 
the auditing context (Anderson-Gough et al. 2005; Kornberger et al. 2010; 
Hardies 2011). Furthermore, this study extends earlier research by adding the 
important situational factor of a high-risk engagement context, which can magnify 
gender differences and lead to observable differences within the professional 
arena. Given the nature of auditors’ work, which is subject to a set of professional 
codes and standards and professional training, it would be naïve to expect auditor 
gender differences to be clear in every decision-making context. Hence, 
identifying the factors that may motivate individual auditors’ specific behaviours 
is important for understanding individual differences within the audit context. The 
findings of this study suggest audit firms should consider gender differences in 
assigning staff, especially audit partners, to audit groups, in addition to providing 
training and developing decision aids. Furthermore, if implicit stereotypes are part 
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of the organisational culture and subtle biases may unconsciously influence 
auditors’ judgement, diversity training and direct intervention such as mentoring 
programs may be appropriate.  
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, this study examines a 
relatively short, post-GFC period from 2013 to 2014, when there was a greater 
focus on risk: accordingly, its results could be specific to the time period under 
examination. Studies that include multiple-year data may offer a better 
examination of the findings in the present research, which is another important 
future research opportunity. 
Second, while audit engagement partners are fully responsible for the 
process of making client acceptance decisions, it should be noted that the audit 
engagement process always involves two parties and that acceptance decisions are 
jointly made by both the auditor and the prospective or existing client. Therefore, 
while the results could show an association between auditor gender and clientele 
riskiness, explanations that focus only on the auditor decision-making process 
may limit the ability to assign causality to the results. Furthermore, although other 
auditor characteristics and client-related attributes were controlled in this study, 
there might be omitted variables and endogeneity issues associated with the 
reported results. This is an area in which future research can address a more 
comprehensive inclusion of possible control variables. 
Finally, this study uses mainly financial characteristics of client firms as a 
proxy measure for the riskiness of female and male auditors’ clienteles. However, 
auditors assess engagement risk based on both financial and non-financial 
information (e.g. management integrity, control environment, etc.), which is 
unobservable and for which gathering the necessary data within the present study 
setting is difficult. Future research into how individual auditors incorporate both 
financial and non-financial information when evaluating client risks may provide 
further insight into which risk factors affect auditors’ decisions and how female 
and male auditors assess client risk factors differently.
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Table 1: Summary of Sample Selection 
Description 
Total number 
of 
observations 
2013 2014 
Number of listed companies during the financial year  3,797 1,864 1,933 
Exclusions 
   
    Companies in the financial sectors (GICS code 40) 352 165 187 
    Companies with insufficient financial information 357 158 199 
    Foreign companies 131 64 67 
    Functional currency is not $AUD 85 43 42 
    Non 12-month reporting period 36 5 31 
    Under Suspension 27 13 14 
    No audit fee data  25 16 9 
    No auditor name 6 2 4 
    Gender cannot be identified 9 7 2 
    Double auditor signed 2 1 1 
Number of Observations in the Final sample                                                                                                      2,767 1,390 1,377 
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Table 2: Definition of Variables 
Dependent Variables 
PBANK Probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijeswki score 
  
Estimated using the coefficients obtained from adjusted Zmijeswki model is 
as follow: 
 -4.803-3.6(NI/TA) + 5.4(TL/TA)-0.1(CA/CL) 
 
Where: 
 NI   = Net income after tax 
 TA   =    Total assets 
 TL   = Total liabilities 
 CA   = Current assets 
 CL   = Current liabilities 
 
ROA Net income divided by total assets 
INVREC Sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets 
 
Variable of interest 
FEMALE 1 if an audit engagement partner is a female, 0 otherwise. 
  
Control Variables 
LnTA Natural logarithm of client total assets at the end of financial year t. 
LnAGE Natural logarithm of number of years since a company was listed in the 
ASX. 
BIG4 1 if the company is audited by Big 4 audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
LnCLIENT Natural logarithm of the number of client firms in the audit partner’s 
portfolio in year t.  
FSPE 1 if the audit firm is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit 
fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) in year t, 0 otherwise. 
PSPE 1 if the audit partner is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated 
audit fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) in year t, 0 otherwise. 
FEERATIO The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor. 
GICS10  1 if the company is in the energy industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS15 1 if the company is in the materials industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS20 1 if the company is in the industrials industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS25 1 if the company is in the consumer discretionary industry group, 0 
otherwise. 
GICS30 1 if the company is in the consumer staples industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS35 1 if the company is in the healthcare industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS45 1 if the company is in the information technology industry group, 0 
otherwise. 
GICS50 1 if the company is in the telecommunication services industry group, 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Tables 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample (N = 2,767) 
Continuous Variables Mean  Median  SD  Minimum  Maximum 
PBANK -1.546  -3.100  9.663  -34.245  138.502 
ROA -0.499  -0.121  1.871  -35.168  10.242 
INVREC 0.153  0.062  0.196  0.000  0.999 
LnTA 17.039  16.736  2.221  10.445  24.488 
LnAGE 2.393  2.303  0.743  0.000  4.718 
LnCLIENT 1.647  1.609  1.002  0.000  3.434 
FEERATIO 0.142  0.031  0.193  0.000  0.954 
 
Dichotomous variables Coding 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage 
FEMALE 1  234  8.46% 
BIG4 1  1,029  37.19% 
FSPE 1  514  18.58% 
PSPE 1  50  1.81% 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Comparing Female and Male Auditors 
 (1) Female Auditors (n=234)  (2) Male Auditors (n=2,533)    
Continuous 
variables 
Mean Median SD   Mean 
Media
n 
SD   
t-test  
(1) -(2) 
P-value 
PBANK -3.190 -3.081 2.720   -1.395 -3.100 10.052   -1.796*** 0.000 
ROA -0.201 -0.045 0.944   -0.526 -0.126 1.932   0.326*** 0.000 
INVREC 0.179 0.120 0.183   0.151 0.059 0.198   0.028** 0.038 
LnTA 17.526 17.201 2.091   16.994 16.703 2.228   0.533*** 0.000 
LnAGE 2.484 2.398 0.866   2.385 2.303 0.730   0.099* 0.093 
LnCLIENT 0.950 0.693 0.749   1.711 1.609 0.998   -0.761*** 0.000 
FEERATIO 0.184 0.125 0.220   0.138 0.023 0.189   0.047*** 0.002 
 
Dichotomous 
variables 
Percentage of female 
auditors sample 
 
Percentage of male 
auditors sample 
 
 
Diff. 
 
 
P-value 
FEMALE 100.00%  0%  -  - 
BIG4 58.97%  35.18%  0.238  0.000 
FSPE 27.78%  17.73%  0.101  0.000 
PSPE 1.28%  1.86%  -0.006  0.529 
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Test Variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) VIF 
(1)PBANK 1.000 
           
(2)ROA -0.796*** 1.000 
          
(3)INVREC 0.067*** 0.077*** 1.000 
         
(4)FEMALE -0.052*** 0.048** 0.039** 1.000 
       
1.06 
(5)LnTA -0.277*** 0.348*** 0.193*** 0.067*** 1.000 
      
1.65 
(6)LnAGE 0.063*** 0.009 0.165*** 0.037* 0.202** 1.000 
     
1.10 
(7)BIG4 -0.059*** 0.110*** 0.157*** 0.137*** 0.517** 0.182*** 1.000 
    
1.99 
(8)LnCLIENT 0.048** -0.121*** -0.227*** -0.211*** -0.345** -0.145*** -0.381*** 1.000 
   
1.40 
(9)FSPE -0.048** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.072*** 0.368** 0.131*** 0.602*** -0.288*** 1.000 
  
1.63 
(10)PSPE -0.009 0.034* 0.064*** -0.012 0.202** 0.058*** 0.137*** -0.080*** 0.207*** 1.000 
 
1.09 
(11)FEERATIO -0.071*** 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.067*** 0.345** -0.064*** 0.304*** -0.206*** 0.191*** 0.063*** 1.000 1.22 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively 
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Table 5: Regression Results for the Client Firm Characteristics 
Panel A: OLS      
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -1.609***  0.195**  -0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.600) 
LnTA -1.739***  0.349***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.864) 
LnAGE 1.521***  -0.163***  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.950***  -0.370***  0.020 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.118) 
LnCLIENT -0.082  -0.017  -0.008* 
 (0.708)  (0.649)  (0.092) 
FSPE -0.131  -0.005  -0.033*** 
 (0.719)  (0.939)  (0.008) 
PSPE 2.750***  -0.448***  0.045 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.206) 
FEERATIO 1.372  -0.142  -0.006 
 (0.116)  (0.189)  (0.738) 
Constant 27.906***  -6.351***  0.063 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.199) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,767  2,767  2,767 
R-squared 0.116  0.138  0.272 
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Panel B: QR 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.358** -0.658***  0.058*** 0.147***  -0.002 -0.040** 
 (0.015) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.825) (0.032) 
LnTA -0.283*** -0.818***  0.094*** 0.191***  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.133) (0.572) 
LnAGE 0.225*** 0.373***  -0.012* -0.047**  0.011*** 0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.008)  (0.074) (0.024)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.602*** 1.448***  -0.112*** -0.298***  0.012* 0.050** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.078) (0.009) 
LnCLIENT -0.115** 0.071  -0.003 -0.010  -0.004*** -0.019** 
 (0.048) (0.523)  (0.702) (0.611)  (0.012) (0.009) 
FSPE -0.111 0.153  0.014 -0.021  -0.005 -0.040* 
 (0.472) (0.566)  (0.410) (0.674)  (0.526) (0.068) 
PSPE 1.024*** 1.355***  -0.129*** -0.262***  0.053** -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.014) (0.794) 
FEERATIO 0.273 0.568  -0.034 0.007  0.002 -0.002 
 (0.217) (0.308)  (0.235) (0.912)  (0.745) (0.934) 
Constant 2.826*** 13.988***  -1.707*** -3.692***  0.000 0.214*** 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.986) (0.010) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
      
N 2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767 
Panel A details pooled OLS regression results of Models (1), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the 
column used as the dependent variable, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports Quantile 
Regression results of Model (2), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the column used as the dependent 
variable, respectively.   PBANK is probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijeswki score; ROA is 
net income divided by total assets; INVREC is sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets; FEMALE 
is a dummy coded 1 if a signing engagement partner is female and 0 otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm of 
client total assets; LnAGE is the natural logarithm of number of years since a company was listed in the ASX; BIG4 
is a dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by BIG 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise; LnCLIENT is the natural 
logarithm of the number of client firms in the audit partner’s portfolio; FSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the audit firm is 
industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; 
PSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the audit partner is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit fees within 
an industry (two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; FEERATIO is non-audit fees divided by the total of audit and non-
audit fees paid to the auditor. All reported p-values are two-tailed. Statistical significance based on a two – tailed 
test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
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Table 6: Balanced Panel Data -Client firm control 
Panel A: OLS      
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -1.519***  0.155*  -0.006 
 (0.000)  (0.055)  (0.620) 
LnTA -1.435***  0.321***  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.802) 
LnAGE 1.411***  -0.145**  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.237***  -0.294***  0.018 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.137) 
LnCLIENT -0.089  -0.013  -0.009** 
 (0.657)  (0.687)  (0.048) 
FSPE 0.250  -0.062  -0.033** 
 (0.479)  (0.357)  (0.013) 
PSPE 2.172***  -0.340***  0.057 
 (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.106) 
FEERATIO 1.013  -0.117  0.003 
 (0.244)  (0.272)  (0.857) 
Constant 23.063***  -6.181***  0.072 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.173) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,558  2,558  2,558 
R-squared 0.105  0.149  0.287 
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Panel B: QR 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.456*** -0.697**  0.044** 0.157***  -0.001 -0.041** 
 (0.002) (0.023)  (0.017) (0.001)  (0.891) (0.030) 
LnTA -0.232*** -0.787***  0.089*** 0.187***  0.002 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.109) (0.676) 
LnAGE 0.243*** 0.462***  -0.009 -0.055**  0.011*** 0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.006)  (0.202) (0.015)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.457*** 1.359***  -0.099*** -0.287***  0.012 0.049** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.141) (0.029) 
LnCLIENT -0.120** 0.073  -0.007 -0.014  -0.003** -0.017** 
 (0.025) (0.538)  (0.297) (0.394)  (0.033) (0.023) 
FSPE -0.017 0.123  -0.001 -0.028  -0.004 -0.038* 
 (0.907) (0.635)  (0.949) (0.520)  (0.624) (0.075) 
PSPE 1.068*** 1.262***  -0.114*** -0.267***  0.046* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.065) (0.990) 
FEERATIO 0.171 0.211  -0.032 -0.001  0.006 0.012 
 (0.477) (0.714)  (0.264) (0.984)  (0.459) (0.752) 
Constant 1.554 13.570***  -1.621*** -3.622***  -0.004 0.184** 
 (0.120) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.834) (0.024) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
      
Observations 2,558 2,558  2,558 2,558  2,558 2,558 
Panel A details pooled OLS regression results of Models (1), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of 
the column used as the dependent variable, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports 
Quantile Regression results of Model (2), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the column used as 
the dependent variable, respectively.   PBANK is probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted 
Zmijeswki score; ROA is net income divided by total assets; INVREC is sum of inventory and receivables 
divided by total assets; FEMALE is a dummy coded 1 if a signing engagement partner is female and 0 
otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm of client total assets; LnAGE is the natural logarithm of number of 
years since a company was listed in the ASX; BIG4 is a dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by BIG 4 
audit firms and 0 otherwise; LnCLIENT is the natural logarithm of the number of client firms in the audit 
partner’s portfolio; FSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the audit firm is industry specialist based on amount of 
aggregated audit fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; PSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the 
audit partner is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit fees within an industry (two-digit 
GIC) and 0 otherwise; FEERATIO is non-audit fees divided by the total of audit and non-audit fees paid to 
the auditor. All reported p-values are two-tailed.Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
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Table 7: Balanced Panel Data -Audit Partner control 
Panel A: OLS      
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -1.505***  0.201**  0.007 
 (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.686) 
LnTA -1.334***  0.295***  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.762) 
LnAGE 1.329***  -0.112**  0.031*** 
 (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.312***  -0.281***  0.014 
 (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.375) 
LnCLIENT -0.112  -0.009  -0.005 
 (0.635)  (0.814)  (0.405) 
FSPE 0.028  -0.053  -0.029* 
 (0.946)  (0.550)  (0.055) 
PSPE 2.062***  -0.304**  0.060* 
 (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.081) 
FEERATIO 1.513  -0.147  -0.010 
 (0.166)  (0.208)  (0.635) 
Constant 21.058***  -5.731***  0.030 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.622) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 1,944  1,944  1,944 
R-squared 0.101  0.156  0.275 
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Panel B: QR 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.380** -0.698**  0.072*** 0.185***  0.008 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.024)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.661) (0.971) 
LnTA -0.180*** -0.749***  0.084*** 0.176***  0.002* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.052) (0.982) 
LnAGE 0.251*** 0.601***  -0.009 -0.051*  0.016*** 0.043*** 
 (0.000) (0.006)  (0.253) (0.068)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.374*** 1.421***  -0.094*** -0.257***  0.009 0.024 
 (0.008) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.268) (0.234) 
LnCLIENT -0.132** 0.101  -0.012 -0.016  -0.003* -0.014 
 (0.028) (0.468)  (0.142) (0.477)  (0.083) (0.112) 
FSPE 0.095 0.035  0.001 -0.018  -0.002 -0.015 
 (0.501) (0.914)  (0.959) (0.756)  (0.822) (0.506) 
PSPE 0.775** 1.641***  -0.102* -0.325***  0.048** -0.003 
 (0.030) (0.002)  (0.069) (0.002)  (0.049) (0.961) 
FEERATIO 0.170 0.388  -0.052 -0.102  0.001 -0.027 
 (0.526) (0.502)  (0.142) (0.288)  (0.882) (0.424) 
Constant 0.512 11.744***  -1.512*** -3.258***  -0.032 0.164* 
 (0.605) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.292) (0.075) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
      
Observations 1,944 1,944  1,944 1,944  1,944 1,944 
Panel A details pooled OLS regression results of Models (1), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of 
the column used as the dependent variable, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports 
Quantile Regression results of Model (2), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the column used as 
the dependent variable, respectively.   PBANK is probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted 
Zmijeswki score; ROA is net income divided by total assets; INVREC is sum of inventory and receivables 
divided by total assets; FEMALE is a dummy coded 1 if a signing engagement partner is female and 0 
otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm of client total assets; LnAGE is the natural logarithm of number of 
years since a company was listed in the ASX; BIG4 is a dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by BIG 4 
audit firms and 0 otherwise; LnCLIENT is the natural logarithm of the number of client firms in the audit 
partner’s portfolio; FSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the audit firm is industry specialist based on amount of 
aggregated audit fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; PSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the 
audit partner is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit fees within an industry (two-digit 
GIC) and 0 otherwise; FEERATIO is non-audit fees divided by the total of audit and non-audit fees paid to 
the auditor. All reported p-values are two-tailed.Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
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Table 8: Yearly Results 
Panel A: OLS 
 2013  2014 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC  (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value)  
Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
FEMALE -1.637***  0.272***  -0.005  -1.680***  0.125  -0.007 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.736)  (0.001)  (0.325)  (0.624) 
LnTA -1.689***  0.348***  -0.000  -1.781***  0.351***  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.932)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.679) 
LnAGE 1.938***  -0.258**  0.023***  1.199***  -0.088*  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.767***  -0.373***  0.017  2.040***  -0.362***  0.022 
 (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.247)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.117) 
LnCLIENT -0.108  -0.047  -0.007  -0.050  0.016  -0.009 
 (0.695)  (0.337)  (0.209)  (0.854)  (0.755)  (0.115) 
FSPE -0.232  0.056  -0.033**  0.032  -0.073  -0.035** 
 (0.671)  (0.583)  (0.028)  (0.950)  (0.419)  (0.027) 
PSPE 1.988**  -0.324*  0.108**  3.273***  -0.530***  -0.019 
 (0.031)  (0.052)  (0.018)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.566) 
FEERATIO -0.340  -0.063  0.024  3.173**  -0.217  -0.038 
 (0.685)  (0.633)  (0.289)  (0.030)  (0.170)  (0.107) 
Constant 25.264***  -6.100***  0.073  29.801***  -6.565***  0.056 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.199)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.308) 
Industry Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
            
N 1,390  1,390  1,390  1,377  1,377  1,377 
R-squared 0.112  0.131  0.284  0.125  0.151  0.266 
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Panel B: QR 
 
2013 
 
2014 
  (1)PBANK 
 
(2)ROA 
 
(3)INVREC 
 
(1)PBANK 
 
(2)ROA 
 
(3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80 
 
q50 q20 
 
q50 q80 
 
q50 q80 
 
q50 q20 
 
q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.436** -0.885** 
 
0.079*** 0.202*** 
 
0.003 
-
0.040** 
 
-0.252 -0.587** 
 
0.037 0.155** 
 
-0.006 -0.032 
 
(0.032) (0.023) 
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
 
(0.821) (0.043) 
 
(0.325) (0.044) 
 
(0.168) (0.029) 
 
(0.580) (0.360) 
LnTA 
-
0.235*** 
-
0.771*** 
 
0.098*** 0.198*** 
 
0.002 0.000 
 
-
0.318*** 
-
0.853*** 
 
0.090*** 0.190*** 
 
0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.234) (0.950) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.363) (0.318) 
LnAGE 0.315*** 0.756*** 
 
-0.030** -0.071** 
 
0.011**
* 0.032** 
 
0.187** 0.327** 
 
-0.003 -0.047* 
 
0.012**
* 
0.036**
* 
 
(0.005) (0.007) 
 
(0.029) (0.038) 
 
(0.003) (0.017) 
 
(0.026) (0.043) 
 
(0.714) (0.090) 
 
(0.001) (0.004) 
BIG4 0.371* 1.253*** 
 
-
0.101*** 
-
0.374*** 
 
0.009 0.033 
 
0.720*** 1.436*** 
 
-
0.103*** 
-
0.250*** 
 
0.023** 0.068** 
 
(0.064) (0.009) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.374) (0.262) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.022) (0.011) 
LnCLIENT -0.095 0.022 
 
0.003 -0.038 
 
-0.003 -0.020* 
 
-0.165* 0.109 
 
-0.007 0.009 
 
-
0.005** -0.016 
 
(0.228) (0.903) 
 
(0.818) (0.146) 
 
(0.148) (0.071) 
 
(0.090) (0.541) 
 
(0.365) (0.738) 
 
(0.016) (0.118) 
FSPE 0.076 -0.074 
 
0.002 0.012 
 
-0.003 -0.033 
 
-0.308 0.373 
 
0.014 -0.038 
 
-0.019* -0.041 
 
(0.707) (0.835) 
 
(0.938) (0.873) 
 
(0.787) (0.249) 
 
(0.141) (0.343) 
 
(0.525) (0.566) 
 
(0.097) (0.139) 
PSPE 0.610 1.291* 
 
-0.033 -0.185 
 
0.084** 0.022 
 
1.301*** 1.342** 
 
-
0.186*** -0.317** 
 
-0.015 -0.017 
 
(0.182) (0.081) 
 
(0.588) (0.136) 
 
(0.021) (0.863) 
 
(0.000) (0.020) 
 
(0.001) (0.010) 
 
(0.696) (0.685) 
FEERATIO 0.206 -0.418 
 
0.015 0.111 
 
0.006 -0.001 
 
0.399 1.494** 
 
-0.058 -0.119 
 
-0.001 -0.015 
 
(0.514) (0.539) 
 
(0.756) (0.309) 
 
(0.647) (0.989) 
 
(0.264) (0.046) 
 
(0.150) (0.264) 
 
(0.918) (0.752) 
Constant 1.520 
12.542**
* 
 
-
1.743*** 
-
3.782*** 
 
-0.011 0.194** 
 
3.566*** 
14.649**
* 
 
-
1.597*** 
-
3.698*** 
 
0.024 0.244** 
 
(0.229) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.783) (0.049) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.485) (0.024) 
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Industry Included Included  Included Included  Include
d 
Include
d  
Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Include
d 
Include
d  
Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
                  
Observation
s 1,390 1,390   1,390 1,390   1,390 1,390 
 
1,377 1,377   1,377 1,377   1,377 1,377 
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Table 9. Auditors’ New and Retained Clients 
 
Panel A: OLS 
 New Client Decision  Retention Decision 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC  (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value)  
Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
FEMALE -1.991***  0.129  -0.060**  -1.882***  0.206*  0.005 
 (0.008)  (0.130)  (0.037)  (0.005)  (0.093)  (0.771) 
LnTA -1.519**  0.291***  0.000  -1.793***  0.383***  -0.000 
 (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.979)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.981) 
LnAGE 1.367  -0.135  0.014  1.488***  -0.103  0.031*** 
 (0.132)  (0.367)  (0.373)  (0.001)  (0.121)  (0.000) 
BIG4 0.903  -0.310**  0.051*  1.955***  -0.371**  0.012 
 (0.273)  (0.017)  (0.080)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.453) 
LnCLIENT 0.104  0.007  -0.023**  0.038  0.013  -0.004 
 (0.798)  (0.865)  (0.045)  (0.909)  (0.857)  (0.564) 
FSPE 0.581  -0.063  -0.086***  0.014  -0.120  -0.015 
 (0.613)  (0.580)  (0.007)  (0.983)  (0.365)  (0.430) 
PSPE 4.764**  -0.699*  -0.037  2.878**  -0.395*  0.016 
 (0.032)  (0.065)  (0.506)  (0.014)  (0.089)  (0.687) 
FEERATIO -1.065  -0.013  -0.039  3.003  -0.223  -0.038 
 (0.422)  (0.946)  (0.459)  (0.128)  (0.269)  (0.172) 
Constant 19.527**  -4.578***  0.081  30.278***  -7.785***  0.038 
 (0.017)  (0.001)  (0.484)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.559) 
Industry Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
            
N 305  305  305  972  972  972 
R-squared 0.167  0.213  0.391  0.121  0.165  0.165 
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Panel B: QR 
 
New Client Decision 
 
Retention Decision 
  (1)PBANK 
 
(2)ROA 
 
(3)INVREC 
 
(1)PBANK 
 
(2)ROA 
 
(3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80 
 
q50 q20 
 
q50 q80 
 
q50 q80 
 
q50 q20 
 
q50 q80 
FEMALE -1.002* -1.960**  -0.005 0.223**  -0.011 -0.059*  -0.221 -0.720  0.066* 0.192*  0.001 -0.023 
 
(0.097) (0.012)  (0.902) (0.026)  (0.404) (0.055)  (0.340) (0.108)  (0.080) (0.078)  (0.946) (0.557) 
LnTA -0.374*** -0.878***  0.093*** 0.191***  -0.000 0.002  -0.289*** -0.835***  0.090*** 0.186***  0.002 -0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.989) (0.774)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.180) (0.394) 
LnAGE 0.134 0.227  0.006 -0.071  0.006 0.011  0.231** 0.424  -0.002 -0.043  0.015*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.516) (0.577)  (0.756) (0.216)  (0.486) (0.591)  (0.037) (0.153)  (0.859) (0.386)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.524 0.685  -0.110** -0.226**  0.044** 0.079*  0.707*** 1.407***  -0.113*** -0.217***  0.001 0.037 
 
(0.202) (0.316)  (0.020) (0.033)  (0.028) (0.067)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.010)  (0.911) (0.278) 
LnCLIENT 0.035 0.077  -0.014 0.022  -0.003 -0.019  -0.203* 0.075  -0.012 0.022  -0.003 -0.008 
 
(0.856) (0.854)  (0.437) (0.716)  (0.607) (0.276)  (0.054) (0.743)  (0.272) (0.608)  (0.211) (0.526) 
FSPE -0.485 0.780  -0.016 -0.200  -0.046** -0.101**  -0.063 0.089  0.024 -0.008  0.006 -0.001 
 
(0.309) (0.447)  (0.745) (0.154)  (0.036) (0.042)  (0.763) (0.827)  (0.430) (0.930)  (0.728) (0.962) 
PSPE 1.591 1.576  -0.202* -0.394  0.003 -0.023  1.493*** 1.658***  -0.207*** -0.364**  0.017 -0.045 
 
(0.120) (0.383)  (0.082) (0.144)  (0.981) (0.841)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.029)  (0.596) (0.680) 
FEERATIO -0.424 -0.697  -0.037 0.099  0.017 0.021  0.271 1.583  -0.030 -0.257  0.003 -0.047 
 
(0.550) (0.656)  (0.606) (0.605)  (0.634) (0.749)  (0.549) (0.144)  (0.534) (0.146)  (0.827) (0.320) 
Constant 3.354 15.759***  -1.531*** -3.305***  0.028 0.042  2.337 14.011  -1.652*** -3.609  -0.019 0.171 
 
(0.286) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.786) (0.815)  (0.141) (0.187)  (0.000) (0.156)  (0.646) (0.157) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
                  
Observations 305 305  305 305  305 305  972 972  972 972  972 972 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 10: BIG 4 versus non-BIG 4 Auditors  
 
 (1) BIG 4 (N = 1,029)  (2) non-BIG 4 (N = 1,738)     
Variable Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  
t-test     
 (1) - (2) 
 P -value 
FEMALE 0.134  0.341  0.000  0.055  0.229  0.000  0.079***  0.000 
PBANK -2.290  5.753  -2.912  -1.106  11.339  -3.255  -1.183***  0.000 
ROA -0.231  1.137  -0.004  -0.657  2.178  -0.185  0.426***  0.000 
INVREC 0.193  0.193  0.121  0.129  0.195  0.034  0.064***  0.000 
LnTA 18.531  2.271  18.481  16.155  1.644  16.147  2.376***  0.000 
LnAGE 2.569  0.777  2.565  2.289  0.702  2.197  0.280***  0.000 
LnCLIENT 1.150  0.748  1.099  1.941  1.018  2.079  -0.791***  0.000 
FSPE 0.490  0.500  0.000  0.006  0.076  0.000  0.484***  0.000 
PSPE 0.042  0.200  0.000  0.004  0.063  0.000  0.038***  0.000 
FEERATIO 0.218  0.220  0.157  0.097  0.158  0.000  0.121***  0.000 
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Panel B: OLS  
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable BIG4  Non BIG4  t-test      BIG4  Non BIG4  t-test  BIG4  Non BIG4  t-test     
FEMALE -0.430  -2.700***  7.60  0.110**  0.275**  1.52  0.013  -0.026  2.56 
 (0.169)  (0.006)  (0.110)  (0.043)  (0.026)  (0.217)  (0.422)  (0.161)  (0.110) 
LnTA -0.491***  -2.883***  39.60  0.167***  0.522***  22.69***  0.001  0.001  0.02 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.110)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.838)  (0.629)  (0.892) 
LnAGE 0.441**  2.185***  11.42***  -0.050*  -0.231**  3.26*  0.037***  0.014*  3.64* 
 (0.049)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.070)  (0.018)  (0.071)  (0.000)  (0.099)  (0.057) 
LnCLIENT 0.562***  -0.334  6.01**  -0.087*  0.016  2.35  0.006  -0.012**  3.29* 
 (0.004)  (0.284)  (0.014)  (0.059)  (0.750)  (0.125)  (0.455)  (0.031)  (0.070) 
FSPE -0.442  6.205**  5.35**  0.030  -0.185  1.01  -0.031***  -0.007  0.08 
 (0.141)  (0.032)  (0.021)  (0.635)  (0.370)  (0.316)  (0.010)  (0.927)  (0.776) 
PSPE 0.958**  1.584  0.18  -0.151*  -0.376*  1.11  0.012  0.258***  26.66*** 
 (0.022)  (0.271)  (0.674)  (0.087)  (0.056)  (0.293)  (0.634)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FEERATIO 1.361  -0.185  0.87  -0.028  -0.034  0.00  0.008  -0.013  0.35 
 (0.280)  (0.867)  (0.352)  (0.830)  (0.837)  (0.977)  (0.733)  (0.626)  (0.553) 
Constant 6.736**  45.265***    -3.267***  -9.056***    -0.020  0.141**   
 (0.025)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.801)  (0.025)   
Industry Included  Included    Included  Included    Included  Included   
Year Included  Included    Included  Included    Included  Included   
                  
Observations 1,029  1,738    1,029  1,738    1,029  1,738   
R-squared 0.045  0.185    0.139  0.162    0.285  0.259   
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Panel C: QR 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
 BIG4  Non BIG4  BIG4  Non BIG4  BIG4  Non BIG4 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q20  q50 q80  q50 q80 
FEMALE 0.217 -0.038  
-
0.971*** 
-
1.747*** 
 0.014 0.067  0.116*** 0.264***  0.006 -0.034  -0.009** -0.036 
 (0.104) (0.861)  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.449) (0.123)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.689) (0.230)  (0.036) (0.249) 
LnTA 0.022 
-
0.286*** 
 
-
0.662*** 
-
1.528*** 
 0.051*** 0.117***  0.143*** 0.289***  0.006** 0.007  -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.579) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.012) (0.315)  (0.632) (0.426) 
LnAGE 0.079 0.098  0.381*** 1.023***  0.001 -0.009  -0.016 -0.066*  0.036*** 0.036**  0.005*** 0.017* 
 (0.280) (0.375)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.899) (0.641)  (0.252) (0.082)  (0.000) (0.021)  (0.006) (0.076) 
LnCLIENT -0.176* 0.062  -0.117 -0.074  0.003 -0.006  -0.010 -0.022  0.003 -0.014  
-
0.004*** 
-0.010 
 (0.051) (0.749)  (0.138) (0.684)  (0.798) (0.789)  (0.300) (0.404)  (0.661) (0.318)  (0.001) (0.191) 
FSPE -0.123 -0.019  0.787 1.997  0.005 0.016  -0.034 -0.141  -0.011 
-
0.057** 
 -0.056 0.087 
 (0.302) (0.931)  (0.721) (0.833)  (0.746) (0.592)  (0.830) (0.517)  (0.244) (0.016)  (0.724) (0.593) 
PSPE 0.223 0.867**  2.231** -0.040  -0.055 
-
0.153*** 
 -0.064 -0.078  0.013 -0.039  0.321 0.448** 
 (0.403) (0.041)  (0.011) (0.982)  (0.137) (0.008)  (0.738) (0.765)  (0.477) (0.169)  (0.125) (0.016) 
FEERATIO -0.018 -0.154  0.401 0.629  0.027 0.114*  -0.005 -0.045  0.003 -0.030  -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.947) (0.696)  (0.195) (0.591)  (0.326) (0.063)  (0.932) (0.767)  (0.877) (0.525)  (0.614) (0.880) 
Constant - 5.029***  7.926*** 23.899**  - -  - -  - -0.016  0.089 0.407**
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2.081** * 1.011*** 2.601*** 2.458*** 5.094*** 0.149*** * 
 (0.019) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.909)  (0.111) (0.000) 
Industry 
Include
d 
Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included 
Include
d 
 Included Included 
Year 
Include
d 
Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included 
Include
d 
 Included Included 
Observation
s 
1,029 1,029  1,738 1,738  1,029 1,029  1,738 1,738  1,029 1,029  1,738 1,738 
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Table 11: Industry Specialist- Auditor Industry Specialist 
Panel A: Estimated Coefficients for OLS  
 (1) PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -1.694***  0.209***  -0.006 
 (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.650) 
LnTA -1.746***  0.350***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.847) 
LnAGE 1.509***  -0.161***  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.956***  -0.371***  0.019 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.119) 
LnCLIENT -0.087  -0.016  -0.008* 
 (0.692)  (0.665)  (0.094) 
FSPE -0.119  -0.007  -0.034*** 
 (0.745)  (0.913)  (0.008) 
PSPE 2.382***  -0.385***  0.048 
 (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.196) 
FEERATIO 1.396  -0.146  -0.006 
 (0.109)  (0.176)  (0.729) 
FEMALExPSPE 6.108***  -1.047***  -0.053 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.251) 
Constant 28.088***  -6.382***  0.062 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.215) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,767  2,767  2,767 
R-squared 0.116  0.139  0.272 
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Panel B: Estimated Coefficients for Quantile Regressions  
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.429** -0.762**  0.063*** 0.158***  -0.001 -0.038* 
 (0.016) (0.013)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.853) (0.090) 
LnTA -
0.284*** 
-0.823***  0.094*** 0.193***  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.113) (0.650) 
LnAGE 0.227*** 0.366**  -0.011 -0.043**  0.011*** 0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.011)  (0.131) (0.034)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.600*** 1.415***  -
0.112*** 
-
0.300*** 
 0.012 0.049** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.132) (0.021) 
LnCLIENT -0.116* 0.065  -0.003 -0.010  -0.004** -0.018** 
 (0.063) (0.651)  (0.683) (0.597)  (0.013) (0.031) 
FSPE -0.102 0.190  0.013 -0.025  -0.005 -0.040* 
 (0.508) (0.407)  (0.448) (0.569)  (0.648) (0.093) 
PSPE 1.014*** 1.290***  -
0.109*** 
-
0.247*** 
 0.053** -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.009) (0.000)  (0.034) (0.903) 
FEERATIO 0.269 0.621  -0.034 -0.001  0.003 -0.002 
 (0.246) (0.240)  (0.247) (0.994)  (0.729) (0.940) 
FEMALExPSPE 1.915* 2.099*  -
0.259*** 
-0.320**  -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.070) (0.092)  (0.000) (0.011)  (0.758) (0.862) 
Constant 2.833*** 14.159***  -
1.713*** 
-
3.725*** 
 0.000 0.208** 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.990) (0.014) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
         
N 2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767 
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Table 12: Industry Specialist- Audit Firm Industry Specialist 
Panel A: Estimated Coefficients for OLS Regression 
 PBANK  ROA  INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -2.010***  0.222**  -0.013 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.360) 
LnTA -1.737***  0.349***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.852) 
LnAGE 1.525***  -0.163***  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.967***  -0.371***  0.020 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.115) 
LnCLIENT -0.092  -0.016  -0.008* 
 (0.676)  (0.663)  (0.086) 
FSPE -0.328  0.009  -0.037*** 
 (0.400)  (0.906)  (0.007) 
PSPE 2.814***  -0.452***  0.046 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.195) 
FEERATIO 1.376  -0.142  -0.006 
 (0.115)  (0.187)  (0.741) 
FEMALExFSPE 1.473*  -0.102  0.023 
 (0.096)  (0.471)  (0.388) 
Constant 27.905***  -6.351***  0.063 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.198) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,767  2,767  2,767 
R-squared 0.116  0.138  0.272 
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Panel B: Estimated Coefficients for Quantile Regression 
 PBANK  ROA  INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.569*** -0.832**  0.063*** 0.173***  -0.001 -0.046* 
 (0.000) (0.011)  (0.005) (0.001)  (0.844) (0.067) 
LnTA -0.281*** -0.814***  0.094*** 0.192***  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.156) (0.544) 
LnAGE 0.232*** 0.427***  -0.011 -0.048**  0.010*** 0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.120) (0.024)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.598*** 1.376***  -0.112*** -0.303***  0.012 0.050** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.114) (0.025) 
LnCLIENT -0.120** 0.068  -0.002 -0.009  -0.004** -0.019** 
 (0.017) (0.618)  (0.743) (0.644)  (0.011) (0.021) 
FSPE -0.212 0.088  0.015 -0.013  -0.005 -0.042* 
 (0.151) (0.789)  (0.414) (0.787)  (0.618) (0.077) 
PSPE 1.116*** 1.353***  -0.133*** -0.265***  0.053** -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.023) (0.848) 
FEERATIO 0.254 0.532  -0.033 0.013  0.002 -0.004 
 (0.260) (0.335)  (0.218) (0.841)  (0.764) (0.914) 
FEMALExFSPE 0.550 1.016  -0.018 -0.122  -0.003 0.029 
 (0.174) (0.291)  (0.720) (0.253)  (0.869) (0.556) 
Constant 2.793*** 13.934***  -1.719*** -3.697***  0.000 0.211** 
 (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.987) (0.015) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
         
N 2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels 
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
